Derrida & Wittgenstein -- Again

Wittgenstein’s achievement in the history of philosophy consists in turning philosophy away from logical analysis toward contextual explication, and even more in undermining the dominance of epistemology that had characterized mainstream philosophy since Descartes.

Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein, along with G. E. Moore, are the pillars of the “linguistic turn” in philosophy. Wittgenstein, however, came to disagree with the other three in fundamental ways, and the divergence resulted in (or perhaps consisted in) pushing epistemology into the back seat.

According to Wittgensteins logic could not be a science like any other, and hence hinted at his distinctive view, in opposition to both Frege and Russell, that the propositions of logic (and later of grammar) do not convey truth or information in the way that scientific propositions do. His later insistence that clarity is to be achieved by descriptions of use (hence contextually), rather than by analysis, constitutes a sharp radical break from all three of these early mentors.

Derrida and Wittgenstein

"This is one of the better books in American Philosophy. The evaluation of Wittgenstein is the best yet by far, and the devaluation of Derrida, despite the various compliments paid him, is quite devastating. Derrida and Wittgenstein is sure to get world attention."
—Lionel Abel, Professor Emeritus, State University of New York, Buffalo

Though Derrida and Wittgenstein emerged from vastly different cultural and intellectual traditions—Derrida from the French and Wittgenstein from the British—both distrust the "totalizing" concept of metaphysics. In this way, the two belong to the broad contemporary movement of analytical skepticism. Newton Garver and Seung-Chong Lee discuss this commonality, Derrida and Wittgenstein's similar view that language is the key to understanding philosophy, as well as distinguishing the differences between Derrida's style of obscure terminology, long, involved sentences, and multiple meanings, and Wittgenstein's approach to writing, which makes use of simple, familiar analogies and similes.

Looking at Derrida and Wittgenstein's place in the history of philosophy, Garver and Lee assert that while Derrida is playful and witty, this method often obscures his ideas; conversely, Wittgenstein is considered the better philosopher because of his use of naturalism to resolve the problems of Kant's version of critical philosophy. The authors explore structuralism and metaphors as linguistic devices central to the theories and criticism of both Derrida and Wittgenstein.

Working to eschew the often uncritical interpretations given to Derrida's and Wittgenstein's works, the authors seek to further a fundamental understanding of what philosophy is and of how it operates. Toward this end, they explore the role of language, grammar, and logic in relation to metaphysics within the context of Derrida and Wittgenstein's incompatible, but oddly complementary, linguistic theories.