The great legacy of Wittgenstein’s philosophy is his new vision and method

The method of philosophy is the method of grammatical clarification – that is, the description of the logico-linguistic structures of language for the purpose of dissolving philosophical problems. 
Wittgenstein transformed the philosophy of logic, of language, and of philosophy of mind.

But after the mid-1970s his influence waned. The kinds of work and methods he advocated in philosophy of language were displaced by the effort to produce a so-called ‘theory of meaning for a natural language’. Similarly, his methods and preoccupations in philosophy of mind were displaced by the new pseudo-discipline that goes by the misleading name of ‘cognitive science’ – misleading, since it is neither scientific nor cognitive. His general conception of philosophy as an elucidatory activity that contributes to human understanding rather than adding to human knowledge was set aside by philosophers who embraced a cognitive conception of philosophy allied with the natural sciences.
Wittgenstein’s new vision and method is a transition from the quest for truth to the quest for sense or understanding. 
Philosophy is characterized by its problems, which are not empirical, scientific problems. They cannot be answered by experiments, and they do not call for new discoveries. They often appear to be questions about the nature of things. But, Wittgenstein argued, they are typically questions in search of a sense, stemming from certain kinds of unclarity – conceptual unclarity.  And they are to be resolved, or often dissolved, by conceptual clarification.
Clarity is to be achieved, primarily (but not only) by a careful description of the uses of words.